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As misinformation and disinformation spread more rapidly and widely than ever before, 
individuals have been encouraged to be critical consumers of all received information. At the heart 
of this point of contention is the question of where responsibility and fault should lie. This framing 
and dynamic have taken a new form during the COVID-19 pandemic: a risk that the narrative of 
victim blaming may overcome narratives of care and responsibility, at all levels and across 
national contexts. This begs the question of which ethical assumptions individuals and institutions 
will build upon in navigating the crisis and developing policies and best practices for everyday 
life, as well as for what will come next? 
 
 
Hubristic reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
Invoking nature’s wrath is an old trope, going back to ancient Greek myths and moral texts where 
hubris referred to transgressions of the boundaries between gods and humans. The myths of Icarus, 
Cassiopeia, Tantalus, and Arachne are just a few examples of humans who challenged the gods, 
pushed their own natural limits, and were punished for their arrogance. It is this meaning of hubris 
that was inherited by modernity through myths like Faust. 
 
But in ancient Greece there was a second meaning of hubris developed in civil speeches and 
tractates, something along the lines of what we today might call “victim shaming.” In Against 
Midias, Demosthenes uses the term hubris to indicate both verbal and physical assault.2  In the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle refers to hubris as the practice of shaming the victim: “hubris consists in acts 
and words that cause shame to the victim, not in order to obtain advantage for oneself besides the 
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act itself, but simply for the pleasure of it” (Rhetoric 1378b, Author’s translation).3 As in ancient 
moral systems shame is a form of public dishonor, hubris entails the relationship of public 
devaluation so that the counterpart can claim their status or be raised higher in comparison. 
 
Rather than transcendental arrogance against the gods, it is this earthly form of hubris, shaming 
the victim, that characterizes many reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic, even in significantly 
distinct national and trans-national contexts. And it is with this understanding that I will analyze 
and contextualize the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
The politics of shaming the victim 
 
Under the strict locked-down orders of Italy, individuals walking or jogging alone in deserted areas 
are regularly shamed as Manzonian infectors.4 Videos of Italian mayors condemning citizens who 
have ventured out of their homes,5 even when respecting physical distancing guidelines, have gone 
viral and been featured on broadcasts all around the world with little public consideration for 
whether such stigmatization or enforcement is proportionate or effective. In similar cases, a hubris 
mechanism is in place: the victim – the locked-in citizen – is to be shamed. 
 
In the Netherlands, the politics of shaming the victim takes subtler but no less insidious forms, 
where individuals less likely to survive the contagion are encouraged to be role models for the rest 
of the population and give up their place in intensive care units to those with higher odds of 
surviving COVID-19.6 In such framings, the weight of important public policy decisions and 
strategies of how best to manage the pandemic are shifted on to the individual, absolving those in 
power and the institutions they lead. 
 
Such a rhetorical tactic requires unpacking and some contextualization. The objective problem 
many countries are now facing is the insufficient ratio of ventilators to the number of individuals 
infected and in need of ventilation (ventilators/patients < 1). As in algebraic division, the problem 
can be described as having too low a dividend (i.e., too few ventilators) or too high a divisor (i.e., 
too many patients in need of ventilators). Choosing to allocate the cause of the problem either to 
the dividend or to the divisor is not a neutral choice, it is a political framing with ethical 
implications. 
 
Indeed, framing the insufficient ratio as a problem of too few ventilators puts responsibility on 
healthcare policy makers and suggests a concrete policy measure: greater investment in acquiring 
more machines and improving the healthcare system. On the other hand, framing the insufficient 
ratio as a problem of too many patients shifts responsibility on to individual citizens and suggests 
individual solutions; as in the case described earlier from the Netherlands, older and immune-
compromised patients should give up ventilators to younger, “healthier” patients—shaming those 












Hubris in COVID-19-informed international relations 
 
This kind of hubris is not limited to national governments and its citizenry but is extended to 
international relations, as well. On March 25, former president of the European Central Bank 
Mario Draghi specified that “the loss of income is not the fault of any of those who suffer from 
it.”7 A claim that certainly needed to be restated, particularly with respect to negotiations taking 
place between members of the European Council.8 On the one hand, nine European countries 
severely affected by the virus had asked for immediate shared financial tools, backed by European 
institutions, to mitigate COVID-19 disruptions, even recognizing how such tools might further 
bind together these states and potentially relinquish some of their financial sovereignty.9 On the 
other hand, some ministers of finance had called for an investigation into past fiscal management 
of the countries seeking support from the European Union and refused the criteria for loans to be 
relaxed.10 Financially conservative countries indeed argue that the current inability to cope with 
the pandemic is a consequence of past financial dysfunctions. Whatever the outcome of the debate 
for the future of Europe, it is evident that it revolves around the hubristic behavior that pushes the 
victim to face not only the violence of the pandemic, but also the violence of shame. 
 
Against currently resurgent feelings of nationalism, these examples show that hubris is not a 
national trait, but an attitude in the face of disasters. Confronting such catastrophe, a hubristic 
response can see humans either invoke gods’ wrath or identify the root cause in other humans (i.e., 
the plague is a god’s response to human arrogance vs. the resulting hardship of a plague is based 
on specific individual failures). This latter form of hubris is an attitude of the powerful for power’s 
sake. And, where the former understanding of hubris does not leave much room to maneuver, as 
it is rooted in supernatural deeds beyond human control, more possibilities of action can be devised 
within this latter form of hubris. This shame indeed requires two things: a distinction between 
“Us” and “Them” as well as framing the situation as a zero-sum game. 
 
Two recommendations for scholars, policy makers, and journalists 
 
Regarding the distinction, we might want to ask how “them” became “Them” and “us” became 
“Us,” that is, which criteria are mobilized to create and reproduce these distinctions. How are well 
worn narratives of the unruly citizen and other bigoted stereotypes resurrected to find fault and 
validate austerity and other such grave decisions? What are the alternative narratives that might 
instead lead to policies of care and mutual aid? 
 
As for the zero-sum game, it corresponds to Aristotle’s definition of hubris as a relationship in 















shaming Italian runners, the credibility of those mayors is strengthened. By shaming the elderly, 
the efficiency of the Dutch healthcare system is reaffirmed. By shaming China or Spain, the 
superiority of the United States and Northern Europe is proven. Or, at least, so some believe. We 
should instead question this zero-sum game on which hubris and its ethics of shame are based. 
 
As scholars, policy makers, and journalists, in these gloomy days we need an ethics beyond shame, 
an ethics that is able a) to account for how old tropes are resurrected and utilized to push for current 
goals, and make those tropes known to the public; b) to avoid building policies on assumptions of 
zero-sum games. Such an ethics is urgent and necessary to rebut the re-emerging narratives around 
biological and financial infectors. A better future cannot be built on the ruins of a social fabric 
where officers despise their citizens and the young sacrifice the elderly. 
 
